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KEY INSIGHTS 
1. A 3PL having joined a security initiative is faced
with the challenge of working with both certified
and non-certified shippers.
2. For its operational decisions, a 3PL should take
into account the penalty costs associated with
these non-certified shippers, as well as the
delays incurred.
3. In cases of small loads and high number of
customers a 3PL should apply a cost model that
includes delay costs.
Introduction 
In recent years, supply chains have become more 
globalized and thus more vulnerable. Indeed, it was 
in the aftermath of 9/11 when governments and 
practitioners became more aware of how seriously 
supply chains could be jeopardized by security risks. 
To understand the impact of these security risks, one 
can look at security attacks such as cargo theft or 
counterfeiting. Cargo theft represents, in Europe, an 
estimated loss of 8.2 billion Euros (according to the 
Transported Asset Protection Association (TAPA)) 
(Europol, 2009). On the other hand, counterfeiting 
represents a major issue for specific sectors such as 
the pharmaceutical industry, where just in the year 
2009 8.3 million doses of counterfeit products were 
seized (Marucheck et al, 2011). 
In order to tackle these security risks, governments 
have developed different initiatives. For instance, the 
U.S. Government has created the CSI (Container 
Security Initiative) and C-TPAT (Customs-Trade 
Partnership Against Terrorism). The European 
Commission has in turn created the AEO program 
(Authorized Economic Operator) under the SAFE 
Framework developed by the World Customs 
Organization. These initiatives are voluntary for 
businesses to join. Prior to joining, businesses 
should not only consider the potential security 
improvements but also know the collateral benefits.  
This thesis tackles the research question of how to 
achieve an efficient and secure supply chain by 
adopting a risk based approach to supply chain 
management. It looks at the case of a Third Party 
Logistics Provider (3PL) certified under a security 
program, facing the problem of having both certified 
and non-certified customers. The specific research 
questions addressed will be: What is the impact (in 
economic terms) on a 3PL’s operations of such a 
problem? How could a 3PL take advantage of the 
Risk-Based Approach for Efficient and 
Secure Trade in Global Supply Chains - 
Impact on 3PL Operations 
By Carolina Ciprés 
Thesis Advisor: Prof. Mustafa Çagri Gürbüz 
Summary:  
This thesis considers the case of a Third Party Logistics Provider certified under a security program having 
both certified and non-certified customers, and analyzes the impact (in economic terms) on 3PL operations of 
such a problem, as well as the potential benefits that may be derived from it.  
Master of Engineering in 
Logistics and Supply 
Chain Management, MIT-
Zaragoza International 
Logistics Program, 2012 
Chemical Engineer, 
Centro Politécnico 
Superior, University of 
Zaragoza 
above situation and segment its customers 
(shippers) to be more profitable?  
 
The conclusions drawn from this analysis could be 
applied to the different programs mentioned above. 
Problem Description 
The increase in security awareness stated above can 
be especially seen in border crossings. Indeed, since 
9/11, the security measures in place at the US 
borders have caused impacts on carriers, such as 
extra transit time costs (Taylor, 2004). 
 
As nowadays supply chains involve border crossings 
due to the increase of globalization, we consider that 
including border crossings into the supply chain 
models should help supply chain managers to better 
capture reality in their mathematical models. 
 
Research in the field of border crossing delays is 
scarce (Maltz, 2011). Nevertheless, supply chain 
actors joining a security program should be aware of 
the existing delays in order to be able to measure the 
benefits from joining such programs. 
 
Among the different supply chain actors, we have 
chosen to analyze a 3PL provider who has joined a 
security program. The rationale for doing so is the 
following: whereas a 3PL provider can be certified 
under a security program, it can have both certified 
and non-certified customers. This may lead to 
several problems, e.g. the 3PL not benefiting from 
the advantages of joining the program, the certified 
customers suffering delays when consolidated with 
non-certified shippers. 
 
The model proposed aims at 3PLs engaged in cross-
border activities (as is a necessary requirement for a 
3PL to join security programs such as C-TPAT).  
 
When a 3PL wants to comply with a specific security 
program, it has to make some investments upfront as 
well as incur in some maintenance costs. Therefore it 
has to ensure that it will be able to benefit from the 
advantages of joining such a program.  
 
According to Sheu (2006), transportation and freight 
forwarding companies incur a cost that can range 
from $ 3,500 to $18,000 in order to become C-TPAT 
certified. 
 
Rice and Spayd (2005) state that security 
investments can not only improve the security of the 
supply chain but also make it more efficient. Indeed, 
they point out that an operator that has invested in 
security can benefit from improved lead times, as the 
probability of having its shipment delayed decreases 
(through the reduction in inspections at customs). For 
instance, in year 2003 C-TPAT certified importers 
received 3 times fewer compliance citations for 
measurement examination than non-certified 
importers.  
 
Moreover, Chow (2006) concludes that FAST 
certified entities not only benefit from having access 
to designated lanes, but they may also face lower 
customs delays, therefore translating into lower 
variable costs. 
 
Nevertheless, for a 3PL operator, having non-
certified customers will hinder the above benefits. If a 
shipment contains orders from non-certified shippers, 
the probability of being inspected at customs 
increases as well as the probability of delay. This 
supports the rationale for charging more to non-
certified customers (as they prevent the 3PL from 
benefiting from C-TPAT even though they have 
made an initial investment). 
 
One example of the above is the business case 
developed by Haughton (2007) regarding the FAST 
program. Haughton states that in the framework of 
the FAST program, Canadian and US authorities 
have mandated that unless all of an LTL carrier’s 
shipments are from FAST-approved shippers, the 
carrier must approach the border checkpoint via a 
regular lane instead of a FAST lane (Canada 
Customs and Revenue Agency et al. 2003) resulting 
in an increase of lead time. 
 
Moreover, literature has shown that governments 
may use strategic delay to force entities to join their 
security programs. Indeed, Bakshi and Gans (2010) 
suggest that there may be cases in which customs 
deliberately perform inspections more frequently than 
required, in order to increase congestion levels and 
induce strategic delay. This overinspection benefits 
governments by providing a stronger incentive for 
trading firms to join security programs. 
 
According to Lee and Whang (2003), the effect of 
increased inspection will be: added variability 
because of more shipments going through 
inspection, added mean lead time and additional 
variability of lead time due to added variability of 
waiting time. All the above translate into more delays. 
 
Therefore, the model is built not only based on the 
current situation but taking into account a near future 
where delays may increase with these strategic 
delays performed by governments. 
Model Formulation 
 
 
The formulation tackles the question of how to deliver 
a set of K orders to a set of R regions. 
  
In the model proposed, we introduce new 
parameters, decision variables, and constraints, to 
take into account the specificities of the security 
problem we are looking at (i.e. the penalties incurred 
for late delivery due to consolidating orders from 
certified and non-certified shippers). 
The objective function is the total cost paid to 
transport the orders plus the penalty cost for late 
delivery. 
݉݅݊݅݉݅ݖ݁ ሺܨ݅ݔ݁݀ ܥ݋ݏݐݏ  ൅  ܸܽݎܾ݈݅ܽ݁ ܥ݋ݏݐݏ 
൅  ݈ܲ݁݊ܽݐݕ ܥ݋ݏݐݏ ݀ݑ݁ ݐ݋ ܦ݈݁ܽݕሻ 
For the experimental design, we define two situations 
depending on the probability of delay due to 
inspection. In the first case we will consider the 
current probability of suffering inspection, and in the 
second one we will increase this probability 
considering that governments introduce strategic 
delay to enforce compliance with their programs. 
As it can be inferred from the model structure, the 
penalty costs increase with the probability of delay. 
The numerical analysis performed has shown some 
trends that may give insights for the further 
application of the present model. Indeed, according 
to the analysis results, penalty costs increase with a 
decrease in the order size and with the number of 
customers. Therefore in cases of small loads and 
high number of customers a 3PL should apply a cost 
model that includes delay costs as the one proposed 
in this thesis.  
Conclusion 
In the present days governments have created 
security initiatives that are voluntary for supply chain 
actors to join. A 3PL having joined such as program 
is faced with the challenge of working with both 
certified and non-certified shippers. 
 
Under such circumstances, a 3PL should take into 
account for its operational decisions the penalty 
costs associated with these non-certified shippers, as 
well as the delays incurred. 
 
This thesis proposes a general model to be applied 
by a 3PL in order to allocate different orders based 
on cost minimization, including penalty costs. 
 
The application of this model will show a 3PL 
provider the value of encouraging its customers to be 
certified under a security program.  
 
The numerical analysis performed in the framework 
of this thesis has shown some trends in the cost 
structure of a 3PL working with both certified and 
non-certified shippers, and how this model will be 
relevant for cases with many shippers and small 
loads. 
 
Nevertheless, the insights from this thesis should be 
validated with more quantitative results, i.e. by 
working with data from industry and applying this 
model to a specific 3PL, taking into account its own 
cost structure and constraints.  
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